Abstract
INTRODUCTION
Law and policy-makers in New Zealand have taken what might be seen, from a conservativetliberal divide, as two contradictory stances on aspects of border control over the past decade. In one move they have progressively tightened and whitened immigration policy generally, making the process for gaining residency in the country more restrictive. On the other hand, they have progressively opened the borders in relation to the immigration of same sex couples, aligning immigration requirements for these couples with those of heterosexual couples. I argue that New Zealand's recent liberalisation of immigration law and policy for gays and lesbians aligns with, rather than contradicts, notions of neo-liberal politics, progressive modernity and the current tightening and whitening of immigration. Same sex couples who most easily fit the immigration criteria will be those from developed 'Western' democracies that also tolerate and recognise same sex relationships according to an assimilative model, and who live together in long term stable, monogamous, property owning relationships sharing domestic chores. These criteria mean that immigration of same sex couples is likely to favour properly homonormatised' lesbians and gay men, who ' Duggan, L. 'The new homonormativity: the sexual politics of neo-liberalism' in R Castronovo itself as mainstream, between the 'extremists' on the far left and the far right.' This gay politics seeks only formal equality rights.' It focuses on gay marriage and access to the military, embracing the idea that sexuality beyond formal marriage is a private matter. Duggan argues that the focus on the privatisation of lesbian and gay relationships of this politics embraces neoliberal economic policy, with its probusiness calls for downsizing government with the privatisation of many goods and services, in favour of the self-regulation of 'free market^'.^ It is a:
[Plolitics that does not contest dominant heteronormative assumptions and institutions but upholds and sustains them while promising the possibility of a demobilized gay constituency and a privatized, depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesticity and c o n s~m p t i o n .~~ Duggan is careful to acknowledge that her identification of homonormativity does not create a category that parallels and reflects heteronormativity, as there are no gay structures parallel to those supporting and sustaining heterosexuality: her project is the identification and naming of an emerging politics in order that it may be analysed and critiqued." While Duggan's analysis is specifically centred in the United States, similar ideas have emerged elsewhere. In Canada it has been argued that in the written and oral submissions on the legislation to expand rights of same-sex partners and to allow same sex marriage 'feminist voices are marginalised' and 'conservative and heteronormative discourses on marriage and family are reinforced.'l2 An analysis of legal submissions made as part of the fight for same sex marriage in Canada ' ibid, at 175-176. ' Davies, M. Asking the Law Question (Sydney, Law Book Co. 1994) at 179-82. 9 Duggan, n l , at 177-79. l0 214. demonstrates that they are predicated on the normalisation of whiteness in the gay subject, masking racial privilege.l3 In South Africa it has been argued that lesbian and gay politics that ignore the ways in which class, race and gender intersect with sexuality tend to reproduce rather than redress these hierarchies, producing a homonormativity in the process.14 To the extent that homonormativity is about reproducing and rewriting race and gender hierarchy in gay rights claims and struggles, these analyses suggest that homonormativity may be emerging in particularly local forms elsewhere. What is important, in my view, is destabilising the progressive narrative of the modern liberal state in achieving 'gay' rights,15 making visible the ways in which 'gay' is raced, classed and gendered, and highlighting the limitations of the rights.
The idea of homonormativity has been extended to homo-nationalism in an analysis of the nation as producing collusion between homosexuality and American nationalism; attention to race-sexuality reveals the 'idealization of the US as a properly multicultural heteronormative but nevertheless gay friendly, tolerant, and sexually liberated so~iety."~ The argument is that the images and rhetoric that emerged post September 11 encompassed a reinvigoration of white, heterosexual norms through contrast with portrayals of terrorists as effeminate, emasculated, and 'perversely racia~ized."~ At the same time a progressive sexuality was championed as a 'hallmark of US modernity."' ~ributes to 'gay heros' contrasted with the Taliban's treatment of Afghani women, and emphasis on the safety of the US for gays compared favourably to the 'Middle East."' These dynamics produced images of gays and lesbians acceptable within the nation, as part of a patriotic nationality.
Rather than a strict heterosexuallhomosexual divide, gays and lesbians would be divided through more complex images, raced, gendered, classed and aligned with nationalism, into those who were acceptable and those who were not; some queers were clearly better than others.20 In the post September 11 production of stories of national identity, it is the queers who most closely conformed to the images of heroes who were the 'good' queers.
These types of analyses use the idea of nations as imagined political communitiesz' told in stories that proliferate at times of national crisis. Nations are imagined because no member can ever know all of those who make up the nation, and therefore each carries a fictional image or story of the nation, and are imagined communities in the sense that all members of the nation are imagined as part of this fiction.22 AS imagined political communities, nations are the stories that are told about collective political i d e n t i i i e~.~~ These stories of collective identities produce identities that are acceptable and even heroic within the community, and also typically mask various forms of inequality, exclusion and e~ploitation.'~ The inclusion of some identities occurs at the expense of the exclusion of others, and identifying particular national identities serves to repress other possibilities for both national and individual identities, as well as collective and individual differences within the '' lbid, at 69-70.
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Ibid. at 71. Anderson. B, Imagined Communities: Reflections of the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London, Verso, 1991) . The nation is also imagined as a sovereign state, territorially limited, internally united and free of interference from other nation-states. 22 lbid. 23 lbid, at 6; Stychin, C, A Nation by Rights (Philadelphia, 'Temple University Press, 1998) 1; Bhaba, H, 'Introduction: narrating the nation' in H Bhaba (ed), Nation and Narration (Routledge, London, 1990 ) at 1; See Harris, AP, 'Comment: Seductions of Modern Culture ' (1996) 8 Yale Journal of Law and Humanities 213 at 213 (the philosophy of the Enlightenment and the Romantic opposition 'shape not only the stories we tell about our individual identities, but also the stories we tell about collective identities'). 24~nderson. n 21, at 7.
nation." Stories of national identity may also produce internal and external enemies to the nation, and may shift over time, or spring up in response to major events, such as the September 11 bombings.
Questions of the boundaries of nations, and internal and external demarcation, intersect with analyses of domestic law and domestication in lesbian and gay lives. Domestic laws are the laws internal to a sovereign state, including its immigration law. The domestic sphere is typically thought of as the home, or the private sphere, traditionally thought of as a place where the law does not intrude.
The domestic sphere can be a place for domination along gender lines. Feminists and other critical scholars have critiqued the publiclprivate distinction, the supposedly natural gendering of the two spheres along a malelfernale divide, and the idea that the law does not intrude into the home.= in critical theory domestication may also mean relegation to the domestic sphere, or more generally bringing one group of people under the power or control of another, or the internalisation of the views of the dominant culture as 'common sense'." Using these analyses gays and lesbians might be said to be domesticated when they conform to heteronormative ideas about relationships, such as engaging in long term monogamous relationships in which they live or aspire to a middle class lifestyle, and in which they perform their sexuality only or mainly in the private, domestic realm of the household. During the same period in which immigration law and policy has been whitened and tightened, a story of legal recognition within New Zealand, and the relaxing of national boundaries into the country, can be told in relation to sexual minorities, and in particular, same sex couples. It is sometimes told as a story of progressive modernity. The familiar idea is that liberal states, over time, take steps to recognise, and confer rights on, more and more marginalised groups, making progress towards full equality. It is a story in which legal recognition of same sex relationships in civil unions in New Zealand, and legal equality with married and de facto couples in most other areas, including immigration, at least on one telling, has been achieved with surprising rapidity subsequent to the challenge to the exclusion of lesbians and gay men from marriage on the grounds of discrimination in 1996. This story has parallels in the United Kingdom and Canada. In Canada, once courts began to recognise A partnership is considered to be genuine and stable it if it has been entered into with the intention of being maintained on a long-term exclusive basis and is likely to endure." Factors that have a bearing on whether the two people are living together in a partnership that is genuine and stable include the duration of the relationship, the existence, nature and extent of the partners' common residence, the degree of financial dependence or interdependence, the common ownership, use and acquisition of property, the degree of commitment of the partners to a shared life, children, the pelformance of common household duties by the partners, and the who will be included in and who will be excluded from the nation. The criteria for inclusion tell stories of New Zealand's aspirations for national identity, for its imagined political community. These stories may be multiple, shifting, and even contradictory. Those admitted may be differently positioned in the stories.
buttressing certain stories by inclusion or by contrast. Further, the implementation of immigration law and policy produces subjects through regulation:
m o become subject to regulation is also to become subjectivated by it, that is, to be brought into being as a subject precisely through being regulated.77
The subject is literally brought into the nation through regulation, producing an identity through the performance of meeting the criteria to the satisfaction of the officials.
In this section I want to make two points about the regulatory process for same sex immigration in New Zealand. First, I want to consider the dynamics of opening the country's borders to lesbian and gay couples while simultaneously tightening and whitening immigration policy. Second, I want to consider the implications of including same sex couples in the category of de facto and aligning that category with the categories of marriage and civil union, so that the criteria applied to same sex couples is the criteria developed to determine which heterosexual couples ought to be included in the natiom7' I want to analyse the heteronormativity and hom~normativity~~ of the criteria. Heteronormativity includes the norms of heterosexuality as well as the failure to recognise any differences in same sex relationships. Following on from the discussion earlier in the chapter, homonormativity includes depoliticisation as well as domesticity and privatisation It includes the ways in which entry into the area of domestic law requires proof of The implications of aligning criteria for immigration of same sex couples to existing criteria for heterosexual couples foregrounds sexuality as the only difference that is recognised. Lesbian and gay couples have to prove to the satisfaction of immigration officers that they are just like the types of heterosexual couples who meet the criteria except for their sexuality; 'an intelligible legal subject is produced solely against heterosexuality and hence, is "just gay.""' This binary approach to difference fails to address other possible differences, such as class, gender and race.
The result is likely to be that those lesbians and gay men admitted to the country will differ from heterosexual couples admitted only in their sexuality; they will tend to be privileged along in race, class and gender, and that privilege will be occluded in part by the focus on sexuality." To the extent that the criteria privilege middle class white men, then middle class white gay men will be privileged by this approach to same sex immigrati~n.~' As discussed above. New Zealand's historical 'whiter than white' immigration policy has been reinscribed in the recent tightening and whitening of immigration law and policy. The new, more stringent English language requirements were adopted about the same time as the same sex immigration criteria were opened. The language requirements apply to the partnership policy, and each partner must separately meet the ~riteria.'~ These criteria are likely to ensure that same sex immigration approvals are aligned withthe overall trend, discussed above, of favouring those from English speaking, predominantly white, countries.
As discussed above, the CUA regulations recognise only five types of overseas same sex relationships as civil unions: Finland's registered partnerships;
Lenon. n 13, at 408. the United Kingdom's civil partnerships; Germany's life partnerships; New Jersey's domestic partnerships; and Vermont's civil unions. All five of these are developed countries that are predominantly white. This means that same sex couples from other countries, even where they have a legally recognised relationship, will be in the de facto relationship category, and may therefore have to meet a different, and potentially more stringent, criteria. Interestingly, in the United Kingdom, the legally recognised relationships in 25 overseas countries and states in the United States will be recognised as civil partnerships in a non-exhaustive list.84 With one possible exception, this is also a list of developed, predominantly white c o u n t r i e~.~~ Further, the website of the UK Gay and Lesbian Immigration Group notes that the most common reason given for refusal in the proposed civil partner category is that the relationship is not genuine, and this is particularly true where the foreign applicant is from a developing ~ountry.~"nfortunately, this type of information is not available for New Zealand. However, the short New Zealand list of recognised relationships, combined with the possibility of different criteria for de facto relationships, and the UK experience, suggest that this is an area for concern, and that it may well be more difficult for those lesbians and gay men from developing countries to migrate.
Combined with the alignment of criteria for same sex immigration with that of heterosexuals, which I will discuss next, this analysis suggests that the idea of a 'national heterosexuality' that is sanitised and deracialised (white) may fit here."
The existing criteria embrace heteronormativity, or norms of heterosexuality, and as a result tend to call for the production of homonormatised lesbian and gay " Holt, n 90, at 33. 93 ibid, at 33: 'lesbians and gay men have been among those challenging the idea that a commitment to another person necessarily entails sexual exclusivity, living together, or fixed gender roles for each partner.'
Kitzinger have written of their relationship that they had both previously come out of long-term 'marriage-like' relationships and were committed, both personally and politically, to having a relationship with more autonomy, freedom and openness.94
They found the idea of making an ostentatious ceremony of their private commitment embarrassing, and they did not want to promise each other 'unconditional love, lifelong commitment and sexual monogamy.'95 They chose not to live together; they had individual mortgages, separate houses, separate finances, were on different electoral roles, paid different utility bills and owned nothing in As a result of these choices, they note that they would not have met United Kingdom same sex immigration requirements of two years cohabitation or Canadian immigration requirements of one year of cohabiting in a conjugal relationship.97 Given the way they chose to structure their relationship, they may have had a struggle entering New
Zealand even under its current gay friendly criteria. They would have been unlikely to have evidence to show that they had been living together for 12 months or more in a partnership that was genuine and stable, and nor would they be likely to satisfy the criteria that there 'were genuine and compelling reasons for any period of necessary relation to domestic space, to kinship, to the couple form, to property, or to the nation' are less likely to be fit subjects for immigration."
The reputation and public aspects of the relationship are also factors that indicate a genuine and stable relationship. To the extent that lesbians and gay men who live their politics in public are less likely to be accepted in mainstream society, or more likely to disrupt dominant notions of commitment, the reputational and public aspects of their relationships may count against them. The reputational aspects of the relationship may also be judged by the couple's reputation with extended family, and non-normative, political behaviour may also impact here. Those lesbian and gay couples whose families are not accepting of their relationships, who may also be less likely to be 'out' in other contexts, will also be disadvantaged by these criteria.
Lesbians and gay men who are not 'out' for any reason, including that the countries in which they live are homophobic or persecute lesbians and gays, will be disadvantaged by all of the criteria as it will be more difficult to live with partners, own property with partners and establish a reputation or public aspects of the re~ationship.'~~ These people may have to resort to the refugee or asylum processes, which are time-consuming, costly, and may have erratic result^.'^' Further, the treatment of lesbians and gay men in some countries may fall into a gap between persecution meeting the refugee criteria and difficulty living, or being out, without any specific state persecution. For example, in one refugee appeal the Refugee Status Appeal Authority (RSAA) accepted that the appellant, a 28 year old Nigerian man, would be shunned by his family and ostracised by his church, that his Berlant, n 83, at 558. The basis of the criteria in the dominant heterosexual paradigm and norms also means that there is no recognition of the difficulties that may be associated with realising that one is a sexual minority. For example, a Fijian Muslim man aged 22 originally came to New Zealand to marry a woman chosen by his family.lM It appears that about nine months later he fell out with his and his wife's family and made friends witha gay man, with whom he later entered into a relationship.lo5 At this time he continued to pursue immigration based on his marriage, and it was not until more than a year later that he told immigration authorities that he was in a same sex re~ationship.'~~ In considering whether the man was living in a stable and genuine relationship with his new partner, the Residence Review Board (RRB) stated that doubt arose as to whether the relationship was genuine due to the fact that the man continued to state that he was committed to his marriage and to trying to make it work after moving in with his same sex partner.'07 Not surprisingly, it was submitted on the appellant's behalf that 'at the time he was confused with his life and unsure where he was heading."08 There is nothing in the criteria that addresses, or provides /bid, at 12.
guidance to officials to respond to these types of situations. Indeed, the RRB decision confirming the denial of his residence application makes no attempt at all to place the man's actions in the context of homophobia; it appears to hold the fact that the man did not reveal his gay relationship earlier in the process against him.log Finally, the immigration criteria also embrace concepts of domesticity in a number of forms. Most obviously, factors such as the performance of household duties and evidence such as sharing parental obligations, household activities and joint decision making evoke images of domesticity as home, as .the realm gendered female. The fact that these criteria are integral to the determination of a genuine and stable relationship suggests that lesbians and gay men have to prove that they are domesticated along gendered, heterosexual lines.
To the extent that the criteria are focused on economic criteria and ownership of property those with money and middle class domestic aspirations are privileged.
The factors bearing on whether couples are living together in a genuine and stable partnership include the nature and extent of the common residence, the common ownership, use and acquisition of property and financial dependence or interdependence. Those who cannot afford to own property must prove joint tenancy agreements.
The heteronormativity of the criteria as a whole overlaps with other aspects of domesticity; lesbians and gay men have to prove that they are 'just like' heterosexuals and that their sexuality is private and does not make any real difference. The assumption is that same sex couples set up house, own property together, participate in child raising and family gatherings, jointly communicate, socialise with their families and friends and generally live their lives just like heterosexuals. The reality that they are doing so in heteronormative, homophobic societies that may not recognise and validate their relationships, or that may treat them as second class, in the context of family reactions that may vary from '09 /bid, at 12-13.
persecution to disassociation to mild disapproval, and that they may be struggling with their own sexual identities, is all rendered invisible by the criteria and determinations to be made. This is not to say that there are no immigration officials who understand heteronormativity or homophobia, and respond sensitively to the situations of lesbian and gay couples, but rather that the criteria mean that when that happens, those individuals will bring it to the process, rather than having that understanding integrally incorporated into the process.
CONCLUSION
This chapter started with the identification of two recent trends in New Zealand's immigration law and policy: the general tightening and whitening post September 11, and the opening of the nation's boundaries to lesbian and gay partners. It has suggested that attention to the 'particularities of sexuality, race, class and gender in the immigration criteria for same sex partners reveals that these two trends are not as contradictory as they might at first appear. The lesbian andgay couples most likely to gain entry to the country easily are likely to be those homonormatised couples who are willing to adopt heterosexual models for their relationships, who do not politicise their sexuality, and who are properly domesticated. Those most likely to fit this model are likely to be from predominantly white liberal democracies, the very places targeted for immigration more generally post September 11.
